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LOOKING AT THE MONOPSONY IN THE MIRROR
Maurice E. Stucke *
INTRODUCTION
Although still a distant second to monopoly, buyer power and
monopsony are hot topics in the antitrust community.1 The Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),2 International
Competition Network (ICN),3 and American Antitrust Institute (AAI)4 have
studied recently monopsony and buyer power. The U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) pay more attention to
buyer power in their 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.5 With growing
buyer concentration in commodities like coffee, tea, and cocoa, and among
retailers, buyer power is a human rights issue.6

*

Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law; Senior Fellow,
American Antitrust Institute. I wish to thank for their helpful comments Adi Ayal, Peter
Carstensen, Kenneth Davidson, Thomas Horton, John Kirkwood, Russell Pittman, Robert
Steiner, Spencer Weber Waller, and the participants of the symposium, Buyer Power in
Competition Law, sponsored by the University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law &
Policy. I also thank the University of Tennessee College of Law for the summer research
grant.
1
OECD, Policy Roundtables, Monopsony and Buyer Power, DAF/COMP(2008)38, at
255 (2008), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/63/44445750.pdf (European
Commission’s submission) (“Buying power is an increasingly hot topic within the
competition community.”).
2
Id. at 208 (Netherlands).
3
ICN Special Program for Kyoto Annual Conference, Report on Abuse of Superior
Bargaining Position Prepared by Task Force for Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position
(2008).
4
AAI Invitational Symposium on Buyer Power, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 233 (2008);
Albert A. Foer, Introduction to Symposium on Buyer Power and Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST
L.J. 505 (2005).
5
Compare U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines
§ 0.1 (issued Apr. 2, 1992, revised Apr. 8, 1997) (noting in one short paragraph that “to
assess potential monopsony concerns, the Agency will apply an analytical framework
analogous to the framework of these Guidelines) with U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §§ 8 & 12 (2010), available at
www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf (extended discussion of buyer
power).
6
Olivier de Schutter, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food,
Addressing Concentration in Food Supply Chains: The Role of Competition Law in
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Recently the DOJ and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
investigated buyer power in the agriculture industry’s seed, hog, livestock,
poultry, and dairy sectors.7
expressed relief:

Professor Peter Carstensen, among others,

“For years many of us who follow agricultural

competition issues have lamented the failure of both antitrust enforcement
and market facilitating regulation to deal with continuing problems that
farmers and ranchers confront in both the acquisition of inputs and the
marketing of their production.”8 Over 4,000 people attended the public
workshops in Iowa, Alabama, Wisconsin, Colorado, and Washington, D.C.
The DOJ received over 18,000 public comments.9 Participants complained
about the lack of antitrust enforcement, “a severely concentrated
marketplace in which power and profit are limited to a few at the expense of
countless, hard working family farmers,” and how mergers, left
unchallenged, led to “high input prices, low commodity prices, or other
hardships, having invested particular suppliers or buyers with greater
market power.”10 The U.S. livestock industry, observed several states, is
more concentrated currently than in 1921, when Congress enacted the
Packers and Stockyards Act to respond to a market the “Big Five” packers

Tackling the Abuse of Buyer Power, Briefing Note 03 (Dec. 2010),
http://www.srfood.org/index.php/en/documents-issued/briefing-notes; Aravind R. Ganesh,
The Right to Food and Buyer Power, 11 GERMAN L.J. 1190 (2010); South Centre &
Traidcraft, Rebalancing the Supply Chain: Buyer Power, Commodities & Competition
Policy (Apr. 2008); Duncan Green, Oxfam, Conspiracy of Silence: Old & New Directions
on Commodities 39-40 (2005).
7
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Division Update, Spring 2011,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2011/ag-workshops.html.
8
Peter C. Carstensen, Comments for the United States Departments of Agriculture and
Justice Workshops on Competition Issues in Agriculture, Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 1103 (Jan. 15, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1537191 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1537191.
9
Division Update, supra note 7.
10
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Competition and Agriculture: Voices from the
Workshops on Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement in our 21st Century Economy and
Thoughts
on
the
Way
Forward
5
(May
2012),
available
at
www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/283291.pdf.
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controlled and to ensure fair competition and fair trade practices in the
marketing of livestock, meat, and poultry.11
Despite the increasing interest in monopsony and buyer power, the
larger jurisdictions have challenged few mergers or conduct cases that target
buyer power.12 The DOJ and USDA workshops ended with a whimper.13
And one recent DOJ monopsony case yielded an unusually weak behavioral
remedy.14 The DOJ, however, in 2012 promised “vigorous antitrust
11

Comments Regarding Competition in the Agriculture Industry by Attorneys General
from Montana, Iowa, Maine Maryland, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia 6 (Mar. 11,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/ag2010/016/AGW-15683.html;
2010),
International Federation of Agricultural Producers, Sixth Draft Report on “Industrial
Concentration in the Agri-Food Sector” 4 (May 2002) (noting that four firms control over
80 percent of the U.S. cattle slaughter business, nearly 60 percent of the pork packing
industry, and 50 percent of production and processing of broiler chickens, and process 74
percent of all U.S. corn, 62 percent of U.S. wheat, and 80 percent of U.S. soybeans).
12
Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The
Competitive Effects of Discrimination Among Suppliers, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 271, 272
(2008) (observing how “the merger enforcement decisions by the courts and agencies have
failed to appreciate the buyer power issues presented in some merger cases”).
13
David Andrews, Antitrust Efforts Have Gone in Dustbin of History, NAT’L CATH.
REP., Mar. 6, 2012, available at http://ncronline.org/news/politics/antitrust-efforts-havegone-dustbin-history.
14
In challenging an acquisition, the United States originally asked the court to divest
assets sufficient to restore competition in the affected chicken processing market and to
enjoin the defendant from further ownership and operation of the assets acquired as part of
the transaction. Compl., United States v. George’s Food, LLC, Civ. Action No. 5:11-cv00043-gec (W.D. Va. filed May 10, 2011). But the DOJ later settled for a behavioral
remedy, namely requiring defendant to make several capital improvements to its
Harrisonburg chicken processing plant. Defendant had to (i) install an individually frozen
freezer, (ii) install “a whole leg or thigh deboning line with the capacity to debone a
minimum of fifty legs per minute or new automated lines with similar capacities,” and (iii)
repair the processing plant’s roof. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v.
George’s Foods, LLC, Civ. Act. No. 5:11-cv-00043-GEC, at 7 (W.D. Va. filed June 23,
2011). The settlement, the DOJ asserted, was in the public interest as it significantly
increased the number of chickens that George’s would process, thereby increasing the
demand for grower services and averting the likely adverse competitive effects arising from
the acquisition. Carstensen and a former FTC official objected to both the remedy’s scope
and duration. They argued that among other things the consent decree should require the
DOJ to reassess the transaction’s competitive effects in three to five years and, if necessary,
revise the remedy. The DOJ rejected their concerns, “confident that the effectiveness of
the proposed Final Judgment obviates the need for requiring undefined ‘additional
remedies.’” Response of Plaintiff United States to Public Comment on the Proposed Final
Judgment, United States v. George’s Foods, LLC, Civ. Act. No. 5:11-cv-00043-GEC
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enforcement”

after

“redoubl[ing]

its

already

active

enforcement

activities.”15
One challenge, given the relatively few antitrust cases that target
monopsony power, is that the legal standards for monopsony claims are less
developed than for monopoly claims. In recent years, courts, competition
agencies, and scholars in addressing monopsony begin with a simple
premise: Monopsony is the mirror image of monopoly.16 In the leading
monopsony case, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber
Co., Inc., the Supreme Court’s initial premise was that monopoly and

(W.D. Va. filed Oct. 25, 2011).
15
DOJ, Competition and Agriculture, supra note 10, at 23.
16
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross–Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312,
321-22 (2007) (quoting John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct:
Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and
Predatory Bidding?, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 625, 653 (2005); Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d
1358, 1361 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[M]onopsony pricing ... is analytically the same as monopoly
or cartel pricing and [is] so treated by the law”), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
522 U.S. 3 (1997); Vogel v. American Soc. of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir.
1984) (“[M]onopoly and monopsony are symmetrical distortions of competition from an
economic standpoint”)); GMA Cover Corp. v. Saab Barracuda LLC, 4:10-CV-12060, 2012
WL 642739 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2012), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.
GMA Cover Corp. v. Saab Barracuda, LLC, 10-CV-12060, 2012 WL 639528 (E.D. Mich.
Feb. 28, 2012); Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 308, 324 (D.D.C. 2011)
(quoting Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 202 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.) (Because
“the equation for measuring market power in monopsony is a mirror image of the
relationships that create market power in a seller[,] ... [a] greater availability of substitute
buyers indicates a smaller quantum of market power on the part of the buyers in question.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted))); In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 801 F.
Supp. 2d 705, 724 (E.D. Tenn. 2011); Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 888
F. Supp. 274, 280 n.9 (D. Mass. 1995); Federal Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Improving Health Care: A Dose Of Competition 13 (July 2004), 2004 WL 1685795
(F.T.C.), at 122 [hereinafter Health Report]; Marius Schwartz, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Antitrust Div., Economics Director of Enforcement, Buyer Power Concerns and the AetnaPrudential Merger, Presented at 5th Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum, Northwestern
University School of Law (Nov. 30, 1999), 1999 WL 34804330 (D.O.J.), at * 2 (“The
textbook case of monopsony is the mirror image of monopoly.”); OECD, Monopsony,
supra note 1, at 245 (United States); see also id. at 256 (European Commission); Roger G.
Noll, “Buyer Power” and Economic Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 589, 589 (2005); Dennis
W. Carlton & Mark Israel, Proper Treatment of Buyer Power in Merger Review, 39 REV.
IND. ORGAN. 127, 128 (2011); but see Carstensen, Buyer Power, supra note 12, at 5
(mantra that buyer power is the mirror image of seller power obscures the need for
differentiating market power in buyer and seller situations).
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monopsony power were economically similar and shared a close theoretical
connection.17

Given the “kinship” between monopoly and monopsony

power, the Court suggested “that similar legal standards should apply” to
monopolization and monopsonization claims.18
But as this Article contends, courts and agencies should be careful when
importing monopolization standards for monopsony cases. What works for
monopolization claims may not necessarily work for monopsony claims.
This Article first defines monopsony and buyer power and discusses their
economic, social, and moral harm. Part II then discusses a key issue: How
much market share must defendant possess to be a monopsony?

An

antitrust plaintiff challenging a monopsony (or monopoly) under section 2
of the Sherman Act19 must first show that the defendant possesses
monopsony (or monopoly) power. If courts and agencies assume that
monopsony is the mirror image of monopoly, should the agencies and
courts use the same market share thresholds for monopsonization claims as
in monopolization claims? If a 50 percent market share is insufficient for
monopolization claims, should they similarly conclude that a 50 percent
market share is insufficient for monopsonization claims? As Part II
examines, requiring high market share thresholds for monopsony claims
increases the risk of false negatives.
Part III considers another key issue: should agencies and courts use
17

549 U.S. 312, 321-22 (2007).
Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 322 (“[A]symmetric treatment of monopoly and
monopsony has no basis in economic analysis”) (quoting Noll, supra note 16, at 591). The
Court noted the “strikingly similar allegations” involving predatory-pricing and predatorybidding. 549 U.S. at 322. Given the “general theoretical similarities of monopoly and
monopsony combined with the theoretical and practical similarities of predatory pricing
and predatory bidding,” the Court applied its two-pronged predatory pricing test to
predatory-bidding claims. Id. at 325. Nonetheless, the Court erred. ROGER D. BLAIR &
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 77-78 (2010) (describing
how predatory buyer can purchase other significant inputs at a competitive price so that its
output price is above total cost).
19
15 U.S.C. § 2.
18
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Among the

principles the D.C. Circuit observed from “a century of case law on
monopolization under § 2,” is that a monopolist’s act must “harm the
competitive process and thereby harm consumers.”20 Another risk in
assuming monopsony as the mirror image of monopoly is when the
competition agencies and courts use consumer harm to screen monopsony
claims. As Part III discusses, a consumer welfare screen, contrary to its
aim, increases, rather than decreases, the risks and costs of false positives
and negatives. It promotes greater subjectivity and reduces predictability
and transparency. The deficiencies of a consumer welfare screen are
compounded when one shifts from the neoclassical economic theory’s
assumption of economic self-interest to the more realistic behavioral
economic findings of consumers’ other-regarding behavior and concerns
over fairness.
I. MONOPSONY & BUYER POWER
A. Monopsony
Monopsony often is characterized as the mirror image of monopoly.21
Under its textbook economic definition, the monopsonist purchases fewer
widgets than buyers otherwise would purchase in a competitive market; as a
result, the monopsonist forces down the price of the sellers’ widgets.22 The
sellers have little, if any, market power.23 They decide how many widgets
20

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
See supra note 16.
22
OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 256 (European Commission); Zhiqi Chen,
Defining Buyer Power, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 241, 243 (2008) (“defining characteristic of
monopsony power . . . is the depression of quantity purchased by a buyer.”); Steven C.
Salop, Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 672 (2005).
The monopolist, in contrast, normally reduces its output below competitive levels to raise
its product’s price above competitive level. European Commission, Directorate-General
for Competition, Glossary of Terms Used in EU Competition Policy, Antitrust and Control
of
Concentrations
32
(July
2002)
(monopoly),
available
at
ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/glossary_en.pdf.
23
OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 256 (European Commission); Chen, supra note
22, at 242. The price can be competitive but provide economic rent on the supply side of
21

20-Aug-12]
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to sell at the per unit price.24 The widget industry’s aggregate supply curve
is upward sloping, in that sellers will produce more widgets if offered a
higher price to cover the increase in their marginal cost.25 The monopsonist
profits more by buying fewer widgets at the lower price per unit and selling
less of its final product than in buying more widgets, albeit at a higher price,
and selling more output.
B. Buyer Power
Buyer power has different definitions.26 One definition is the “[a]bility
of one or more buyers, based on their economic importance on the market
in question, to obtain favourable purchasing terms from their suppliers.”27
Buyer power is about superior bargaining position and terms relative to
rivals and/or the competitive norm.28 This can occur when a purchaser
obtains a lower net price or better terms compared to its rivals.
The terms buyer power—along with countervailing power—are used
favorably, such as when “powerful buyers may discipline the pricing policy
of powerful sellers, thus creating a ‘balance of powers’ on the market
concerned.”29

Alternatively, powerful buyers “can credibly threaten to

the market. As Noll points out, the company has little incentive to become a monopolist if
there was no consumer surplus to capture. Noll, supra note 16, at 592. “Likewise, rent is
present in a market if, in the aggregate, suppliers of the product receive more revenues than
are necessary to induce them to provide the quantity of goods that is sold.” Id. That is
certainly true. The monopsonist (like the monopolist) appropriates wealth from the seller
(customer) to itself.
The more surplus to be had, the greater the
monopolist’s/monopsonist’s potential profits.
24
Id. at 594. The monopsonist pays a single price per unit; it pays the same price for
the first and last widget it purchases that year. Carlton & Israel, supra note 16, at 129.
25
OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 256 (European Commission); Chen, supra note
22, at 243.
26
Chen, supra note 22, at 241; Noll, supra note 16, at 589 (noting that term is “rarely
precisely defined”).
27
EC Glossary, supra note 22, at 7.
28
OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 201 (Korea), at 246 (United States) (“the
ability of a buyer to negotiate a favourable price that is nevertheless above the competitive
level”), at 256 (European Commission) (“where a purchasing agreement accounts for a
sufficiently large proportion of total volume of a purchasing market so that prices can be
driven down below the competitive level.”) (emphasis added).
29
EC Glossary, supra note 22, at 7; European Commission, Guidelines on the

8

MONOPSONY

[20-Aug-12

integrate backward and produce the industry’s product themselves if
vendors are too profitable,” observed Professor Michael Porter.30
This Article focuses on the dark side of buyer power: “Where a strong
buyer faces weak sellers, for example, the outcome can be worse than where
the buyer is not powerful.”31 The buyers depress below the competitive
level the prices they pay, as in the case of “the cattle, hog, or poultry farmer
who faces the buying power of the relatively few processors of agricultural
commodities.”32
C. Traditional Economic Concerns of Monopsony and Buyer Power
Under the textbook economic definition, the monopsonist, in depressing
the price of widgets, transfers wealth from the widget suppliers to itself.
The monopsonist will not pass along the lower input price to its
downstream consumers.33 Moreover since fewer widgets are produced and
sold, society suffers a deadweight welfare loss.34
Problems arise once one deviates from the textbook definition. The

Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004/C 31/03 §§ 11.c, 64-67 (2004); ICN,
Unilateral Conduct Working Group, Unilateral Conduct Workbook Chapter 3: Assessment
of Dominance, presented at the 10th Annual ICN Conference (May 2011). Mergers among
buyers can yield efficiencies and lower input prices without increasing buyer power. See
2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 12 (mergers between buyers may not “enhance
market power on the buying side of the market [but] can nevertheless lead to a reduction in
prices paid by the merged firm, for example, by reducing transactions costs or allowing the
merged firm to take advantage of volume-based discounts”).
30
Michael E. Porter, The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan. 2008, at 84; 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 8 (merging parties’
ability to exercise market power constrained “if powerful buyers have the ability and
incentive to vertically integrate upstream or sponsor entry, or if the conduct or presence of
large buyers undermines coordinated effects”).
31
EC Glossary, supra note 22, at 7.
32
Carstensen, Buyer Power, supra note 12, at 277.
33
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 18, at 47 (2010); de Schutter, supra note 6, at 2;
John B. Kirkwood, Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement, B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012), draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1809985 [hereinafter Merger].
34
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 18, at 43-45; DOJ & FTC Health Report, supra note
16, at 13-14 (when the monopsonist reduces input prices, “society foregoes the production
of output whose value to consumers exceeds the resource costs of associated inputs,
thereby creating a welfare loss to society”).

20-Aug-12]

MONOPSONY

9

European Commission states that if “increased buyer power lowers input
costs without restricting downstream competition or total output, then a
proportion of these cost reductions are likely to be passed onto consumers
in the form of lower prices.”35 This is not always true. As the U.S.
competition agencies recognize, significant buyer power, even to point of
monopsony, does not always lead to less output of the sellers’ or
monopsonist’s goods.36 This can be important when evaluating competitive
effects.
First, the supply curve of the sellers’ widgets may be inelastic. Here
buyer power depresses the sellers’ price of widgets but not the total amount
of widgets produced. So, unlike the textbook monopsony, society does not
bear a welfare deadweight loss. There is, however, a wealth transfer from
widget suppliers to the powerful buyers, and consumers do not necessarily
benefit from the exercise of buyer power.37
Second, a monopsonist, like a monopolist, can price discriminate to get
a non-cost-justified price decrease--namely paying each widget seller only
the minimum amount needed for that seller to produce the widget. As
economist Roger Noll discusses, the monopsonist can target (i) more
efficient widget suppliers and extract from them their incremental profits
(Ricardian rents),38 (ii) widget suppliers with lower short-run costs and
extract from them their quasi-rents,39 and (iii) any supra-competitive profits
earned by the widget suppliers.40 Under these scenarios, the more efficient
35

EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 29, at § 62.
2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 12 (“The Agencies do not view a shortrun reduction in the quantity purchased as the only, or best, indicator of whether a merger
enhances buyer market power.”).
37
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 18, at 50; OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 141
(Canada).
38
Noll, supra note 16, at 593.
39
Id. (describing quasi-rents as “the difference between a supplier’s total revenues and
short-run total costs”).
40
Id. at 593-94, 603.
36

10

MONOPSONY

[20-Aug-12

suppliers are punished. A fluid milk processing monopsony, for example,
can demand a lower price from the more efficient dairy farmers who
obtained through their investments more milk, at a lower cost, from better
cows. The farmer is not rewarded from her efficiency. The monopsonist
milk processor simply appropriates the efficient farmer’s extra profits for
itself. Similarly the monopsonist milk processor can squeeze the dairy
farmers so that they do not earn in the short-term a competitive return on
their milking equipment. Eventually, when the equipment breaks down, the
farms close.

The monopsonist can price discriminate by using all-or-

nothing contracts, whereby the farmer must commit to selling a specific
volume at a specified price (that captures the above-described rents),
otherwise the monopsonist refuses to purchase anything.41 Buyers can also
price discriminate by shifting costs and risk to suppliers. For example,
powerful retailers can require suppliers to stock the retailers’ shelves and
take returns.42
A third economic concern is the “commodity problem,” whereby buyer
power depresses price by increasing, rather than decreasing, total output.
Farmers--faced with buyer power and lower prices--increase the supply of
agricultural commodities. This is unusual. Neoclassical economic theory
predicts that monopsony power leads to less output. What appears to drive
this behavioral anomaly is that each farmer seeks a target income; by
producing more, the farmers collectively depress price further.
41

One

OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 246 (United States); Ganesh, supra note 6, at
1216-19.
42
U.K. Competition Commission, The Supply of Groceries in the UK Market
Investigation
12
(Apr.
30,
2008),
available
at
www.competitioncommission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/.../538.pdf (finding that “the principal manner in which
excessive risks or unexpected costs could be transferred from grocery retailers to suppliers
was through retailers making retrospective adjustments to the terms of supply” and
expressing concern that as a result of the transfer of risk “the retailer has less incentive to
minimize that risk”); Consumers International, The Relationship Between Supermarkets
and Suppliers: What are the Implications for Consumers? 6 (July 2012), available at
http://www.consumersinternational.org/news-and-media/news/2012/07/supermarkets_uk.
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example is coffee.43 Coffee growers have little alternatives. Coffee is best
cultivated on hilly land in high altitudes,44 which limits other alternative
crops.

Many coffee growers face “limited access to markets for other

commodities, the perennial nature of coffee plants (and the investment they
represent), strong cultural attachment to coffee, [and] ‘adding-up’ problems
(if different countries diversify into the same products).”45 Coffee growers
also face obstacles in vertically integrating downstream to process their
coffee.46 In the coffee value chain, economic power has shifted from coffee
growers to the trading houses (five of which account for 40 percent of green
coffee imports), roasters (ten of which account for 60 to 65 percent of
processed coffee sales), and retailers.47 So while coffee importers, roasters,
and retailers may compete for a share of the rents, they “combine to ensure
that few of these [rents] accrue to producer countries.”48 When coffee
growers faced declining prices from concentrated buyers, they produced
“even more coffee in an attempt to earn short-term income to meet daily
expenses, and thereby cause[d] oversupply and further depression of coffee
prices, even below the average cost of production.”49 In 2002, coffee prices
collapsed to a 100-year low,50 and eight percent more coffee was produced

43

de Schutter, supra note 6, at 2; Nicolas Petit, Ethiopia’s Coffee Sector: A Bitter or
Better Future?, 7 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 225 (2007).
44
http://www.coffeeresearch.org/agriculture/environment.htm;
http://www.ncausa.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=75.
45
Petit, supra note 43, at 252; Green, supra note 6, at 21.
46
Green, supra note 6, at 21.
47
Id. at 40 (noting how in the early 1990s, coffee exporting countries earned about ten
to twelve billion U.S. dollars, whereas retail coffee sales, mostly in large industrialized
countries, were about thirty billion U.S. dollars; by 2002, retail sales exceeded $70 billion,
whereas coffee producing countries received only $5.5 billion); Petit, supra note 43, at
230-31.
48
Green, supra note 6, at 40.
49
de Schutter, supra note 6, at 3; South Centre & Traidcraft, supra note 6, at 10;
Ganesh, supra note 6, at 1196.
50
Petit, supra note 43, at 225.
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than consumed.51
Some argue that the exercise of monopsony power “usually results” in
higher retail prices downstream.52 This is clearly so when the monopsonist
also monopolizes the output market. The economic harm, for example, of
the monopsonist milk processor that is also a monopolist is twofold. The
monopsonist extracts wealth from the dairy farmers. It also extracts wealth
from consumers by charging them higher prices for the fewer gallons of
milk it sells.53 This concern of a monopsony/monopoly recently arose when
the health insurer Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan sought to acquire its
primary competitor, Physicians Health Plan of Mid-Michigan, thereby
controlling nearly 90 percent of the commercial health insurance market in
the Lansing, Michigan area.54 The acquisition, the DOJ said, would have
harmed both consumers (“higher prices, fewer choices, and a reduction in
the quality of commercial health insurance plans purchased by Lansing area
residents and their employers”) and sellers (acquisition would give “Blue
Cross-Michigan the ability to control physician reimbursement rates”).55
The parties abandoned the transaction, after the DOJ threatened
prosecution.
A related concern is that buyer power can lead to downstream market
power and ultimately a monopsony/monopoly.56 A firm may exercise its
buyer power to (i) reduce prices downstream, eliminating smaller
51

Oxfam, Summary Report Mugged: Poverty in Your Coffee Cup 2 (Sept. 2002),
available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/mugged-poverty-in-your-coffeecup.
52
OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 9 (Executive Summary by the Secretariat).
53
Id. at 246 (United States); Noll, supra note 16, at 596.
54
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Press Release, Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Michigan and Physicians Health Plan of Mid-Michigan Abandon Merger Plans--Decision
to Abandon Deal Follows Justice Department’s Decision to Challenge the Acquisition
(Mar.
8,
2010),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2010/256259.htm.
55
Id.
56
Kirkwood, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 16, at 648-49.
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competitors,57 (ii) encourage sellers to raise their price charged to other, less
powerful buyers (raising rivals’ costs),58 (iii) extract price cuts such that
sellers charge higher prices to other, less powerful buyers (the waterbed
effect),59 or (iv) otherwise foreclose its rivals.60
Alternatively consumers can pay higher prices even when the
monopsonist lacks market power downstream. Suppose, for example, four
monopsony milk processors supply the same broader geographic market,
the greater New York region. Suppose each monopsonist produces less
milk, as it buys less milk from the dairy farmers in its local market. With
each monopsony following this strategy, barring entry by another milk
processor, less milk will be delivered to supermarkets, cafeterias, and other
buyers in the greater New York region, causing milk prices to rise.
The harder case is when buyer power directly harms the sellers but not
the ultimate consumers. Suppose local farmers sell their veal calves to the
local monopsony meat packer.

After slaughtering the calves, and

processing and packaging the finished cuts of veal, the meat packer sells the
veal cutlets nationwide. The local farmer has few options of where to sell
its calves. The calves “have a very short time frame of a few weeks when
they are market ready, so their optimum value quickly drops if they are not
sold in a timely manner.”61 Suppose then the relevant geographic market
57

Id.; Kirkwood, Merger, supra note 33, at 78-79.
Kirkwood, Merger, supra note 33, at 65-73.
59
Paul W. Dobson & Roman Inderst, The Waterbed Effect: Where Buying and Selling
Power Come Together, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 331, 333 (describing the “waterbed effect” as
“better supply terms for powerful buyers can lead to a worsening of the terms of supply for
smaller or otherwise-less-powerful buyers, which might then have an adverse consequence
for consumers if downstream competition is lessened”).
60
EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 29, at § 61 (“Competition in the
downstream markets could also be adversely affected if, in particular, the merged entity
were likely to use its buyer power vis-à-vis its suppliers to foreclose its rivals”)
61
Comment by Patrick Kilsdonk, dated Dec. 29, 2009 submitted in the DOJ and
USDA Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement Issues in Our 21st Century Economy
Workshops,
available
at
www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/ag2010/comments/255233.pdf; see also BLAIR &
58
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where the farmer can sell its calves is several hundred kilometers.62 On the
other hand, the meat packer selling the selected cuts of veal and the retailers
and institutions that buy the veal can turn to a broader geographic area
(perhaps thousands of kilometers).63 The meat packer enjoys a monopsony
in buying calves from local famers, but lacks market power in selling its
packaged veal, since it competes with other meat packers across the United
States. The monopsonist supplies fewer selected cuts of veal. But suppose
that other meat packers sell more veal cutlets so that market output remains
the same. This is a big assumption.64 But if the same amount of veal is
sold, are consumers who buy the veal cutlets harmed?
Perhaps. One potential inefficiency is if other veal calf farmers outside
the monopsonized market replace the lost production at a higher cost.65
Other meat packers are increasing output with incremental input that is less
efficiently procured. Suppose, for example, farmers in other states with a
less hospitable climate--higher temperatures and humidity--start raising
more calves, albeit at a higher cost.66 If their demand is relatively inelastic,
consumers are harmed when the higher costs from raising the calves are
passed to them as higher retail prices.

A second inefficiency is the

HARRISON, supra note 18, at 81 (discussing inelasticity of supply for perishable goods);
DOJ & FTC Health Report, supra note 16, at 16 (“Seller switching costs for physicians can
be significant because: (1) a physician’s time is perishable and (2) it can be difficult for a
physician to quickly replace lost patients.”).
62
Carstensen, Buyer Power, supra note 12, at 278.
63
OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 246 (United States).
64
As Jack Kirkwood reminded me,
That assumes the other packers are as efficient as the monopsonist and have the
excess capacity to make up the lost output at a marginal cost below the market
price. That could happen, but it would not be common. It assumes that supply is
perfectly elastic in this market – that any increase in price will immediately
provoke a compensating increase in supply.
65
Carlton & Israel, supra note 16, at 129 n. 5; Noll, supra note 16, at 595-96.
66
OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 144 (Canada) (observing that an “output
decrease in response to monopsony power in one relevant upstream market that results in
output increases in other relevant upstream markets is typically the result of inefficient
substitution towards less efficient producers”).
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opportunity cost of suppliers who now devote resources in competitive
markets to produce more of the output (veal calves) when they could have
profitably devoted their inputs (such as land) to other uses (such as raising
chicken).67 A third inefficiency is when the sellers (the veal calf farmers) in
the monopsonized market are squeezed of their Ricardian rents and quasirents. The farmers now have less money to purchase goods and services.
In a competitive market, some veal calf farmers would have the profits to
purchase a new novel, see a movie, and dine at a restaurant.

In the

monopsonized market, they forego these purchases, since their income
barely covers basic expenses. The wealthier monopsonist will not take up
the slack by purchasing more copies of the same book. To the extent that
consumers also produce these goods and services, they will be harmed.
But the downstream harm to consumers is less clear when the
monopsonist employs “a different technology, using different inputs than its
output-market rivals.”68 Or the end product competes closely with other
products.
D. Other Economic, Social and Moral Concerns about Monopsony
The downward pressure on the seller’s price can lead to other
undesirable effects. One is an increase in negative externalities. To reduce
their costs, more farmers, for example, dispense waste without the
necessary precautions.69

Sustainability and environmental concerns of

increased soil erosion, reduced biodiversity, deforestation, and water, soil,
and air pollution arise.70
Workers facing financial distress and poverty can impose risk and costs

67

Noll, supra note 16, at 595.
OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 246 (United States).
69
de Schutter, supra note 6, at 2.
70
Green, supra note 6, at 11, 24-26, Table 2; Petit, supra note 43, at 253 (describing
environmental degradation in Ethiopia).
68
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Facing less income and increased uncertainty over future

earnings, suppliers will have less incentive to innovate or invest in their
equipment.72
Quality and consumer choice can also deteriorate, especially when the
buyer enjoys market power downstream.73 With the concessions it obtains,
a powerful buyer may seek the quiet life, with less incentive to innovate or
become more efficient.74
Also of concern are the sellers’ loss of economic liberty and basic
human rights, such as the right to food, work, and development.75 Buyer
power can encourage a race to the bottom for wages, health benefits,
working conditions, use of child labor, and schooling.76 One account of the
coffee crisis concluded:
Families dependent on the money generated by coffee are pulling
71

Stephan J. Goetz & Hema Swaminathan, Wal-Mart and County-Wide Poverty,
AERS
Staff
Paper
No.
371
(Oct.
18,
2004),
available
at
http://aers.psu.edu/research/centers/cecd/research/wal-mart-and-county-wide-poverty/fullstudy/view (results of study suggest that Wal-Mart chain creates costs to taxpayers in the
form of greater local poverty than would occur absent Wal-Mart).
72
Consumers International, supra note 42, at 13-14; South Centre & Traidcraft, supra
note 6, at 12; UK Competition Commission, supra note 42, at 12 (finding that “the transfer
of excessive risks or unexpected costs by grocery retailers to their suppliers is likely to
lessen suppliers’ incentives to invest in new capacity, products and production processes”
and “if unchecked, these practices would ultimately have a detrimental effect on
consumers”); Kirkwood, Merger, supra note 33, at 85-87.
73
W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 104 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“The very nature of monopsony or oligopsony power is that it tends to suppress output and
reduce quality or choice.”) (quoting Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act's Unintended
Bias Against Lilliputians, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 195, 210 (2001)); DOJ Blue Cross Press
Release, supra note 54 (alleging that acquisition gave “Blue Cross-Michigan the ability to
control physician reimbursement rates in a manner that could harm the quality of health
care delivered to consumers”); Ganesh, supra note 6, at 1212; Kirkwood, Merger, supra
note 33, at 79-82, 87-89; Porter, supra note 30, at 84 (“Intermediate customers gain
significant bargaining power when they can influence the purchasing decisions of
customers downstream. Consumer electronics retailers, jewelry retailers, and agriculturalequipment distributors are examples of distribution channels that exert a strong influence
on end customers.”).
74
Kirkwood, Merger, supra note 33, at 82-84.
75
de Schutter, supra note 6, at 4.
76
Id. at 2 (noting how small-hold cocoa farmers in Cote d’Ivoire resorted to child
labor); Green, supra note 6, at 10.
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their children, especially girls, out of school. They can no longer
afford basic medicines, and are cutting back on food. Beyond
farming families, coffee traders are going out of business. National
economies are suffering, and some banks are collapsing.
Government funds are being squeezed dry, putting pressure on
health and education and forcing governments further into debt.77
So to the extent a jurisdiction treats human dignity as inviolable, its
competition law cannot ignore the sellers’ welfare. Its law must promote a
competitive process that promotes (or at least does not hinder) many market
participants’ access to food, work, and a livable wage.78
II. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF MONOPSONY POWER
The economic, social, and moral concerns of monopsony and buyer
power, which Part I discusses, can be attacked on different fronts. The
country, for example, can (i) assign buyer power problems in specific
industries to a regulatory agency,79 and (ii) design laws, as in Japan and
Korea, that specifically address common complaints of powerful buyers in
particular sectors.80 On the antitrust front, the competition authorities can
enjoin mergers that tend to create a monopsony or significantly increase the
77

Oxfam, supra note 51, at 2
Ganesh, supra note 6, at 1229-30.
79
OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 10 (Executive Summary). The UK
Competition Commission, for example, has twice investigated the grocery market. Its first
inquiry, completed in 2000, resulted in a Code of Practice to regulate the relationship
between the largest supermarkets and their suppliers. “However, the OFT received many
complaints that the Code was not preventing supermarkets exploiting some of their
suppliers, and putting many small shops out of business.” Antony Seely, Business &
Transport Section, Library, House of Commons, Supermarkets: Competition Inquiries into
the Groceries Market, Standard Note: SN03653
(last updated Aug. 2, 2012),
www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN03653.pdf. In 2008, “the Commission completed its
inquiry, concluding that in many respects UK grocery retailers were ‘delivering a good deal
for consumers’ but that action was ‘needed to improve competition in local markets and to
address relationships between retailers and their suppliers,’ including a strengthened and
revised Code of Practice, to be enforced by an independent ombudsman.” Id.
80
Id. at 192-96 (Japan) & 203-04 (Korea) (discussing its Fair Subcontract Transaction
Act). The JFTC Chair emphasized the importance of fairness and protecting besides
consumers the rights of the players on a level playing field. Id. at 191 (Japan). The
country’s laws specifically prohibit powerful retailers from common complaints, such as
the “unjust return of goods,” unjust price reductions (after purchasing the product), and
unjust assignment of work to employees of suppliers. Id. at 194-95 (Japan).
78
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anticompetitive risks from buyer power.81

They can prosecute group

boycotts and collusion among buyers.82

This Part focuses on illegally

maintaining or attaining a monopsony under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Section 2 prohibits any person to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce.”83

Since section 2 addresses the evils of

concentrated economic power,84 it is a good starting point for evaluating
monopsony claims.

81

Kirkwood, Merger, supra note 33.
Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Soundview Technologies, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 180, 187
(D. Conn. 2001) (citing Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan, 244 F. Supp. 235, 237 (E.D. Pa.
1965) (“[c]oncerted refusals to buy are no less a violation of the antitrust law than
concerted refusals to sell”), aff'd, 361 F.2d 451 (3d Cir.1966); Gould v. Control Laser
Corp., 462 F. Supp. 685, 692 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (declining to dismiss complaint alleging
concerted refusal to buy; agreement not to take a license except under terms agreed by the
group “unquestionably restrained the freedom of each group member to act as an individual
producer in the laser market, free to contract or not contract with whom it chooses” and
concluding that “competitive consequences of such collaborative decision making cannot
be determined on the basis of the pleadings”)).
83
15 U.S.C. § 2.
84
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (“[W]hatever
difference of opinion there may be among economists as to the social and economic
desirability of an unrestrained competitive system, it cannot be doubted that the Sherman
Law and the judicial decisions interpreting it are based upon the assumption that the public
interest is best protected from the evils of monopoly and price control by maintenance of
competition.”); see also United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274 (1966)
(“From this country’s beginning there has been an abiding and widespread fear of the evils
which flow from monopoly—that is the concentration of economic power in the hands of a
few.”); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 309 (1948) (“Monopoly is a
protean threat to fair prices.”); United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553–
54 (1944) (“‘Trusts’ and ‘monopolies’ were the terror of the period. Their power to fix
prices, to restrict production, to crush small independent traders, and to concentrate large
power in the few to the detriment of the many, were but some of numerous evils ascribed to
them.”); United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 388 (1923) (“The Sherman
Act was intended to secure equality of opportunity, and to protect the public against evils
commonly incident to monopolies, and those abnormal contracts and combinations which
tend directly to suppress the conflict for advantage called competition—the play of the
contending forces ordinarily engendered by an honest desire for gain.”); Charles A.
Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters of U.S. & Can., 260 U.S. 501, 512 (1923) (“The
fundamental purpose of the Sherman Act was to secure equality of opportunity and to
protect the public against evils commonly incident to destruction of competition through
monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.”).
82
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A. Proving Monopsony Power
To prevail under section 2, the antitrust plaintiff must prove first that
defendant possesses monopsony power, and second, “the willful acquisition
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.”85
Having buyer power does not satisfy the first element. Plaintiff must
prove that defendant possesses monopsony power. All monopsonists (like
monopolists) have buyer (market) power, but not all firms with buyer
(market) power are monopsonists (monopolists).86 Firms with buyer power
enjoy more power than a price taker in a perfectly competitive market but
less power than a monopsonist. For example, the Coca-Cola Company
increases its market power by acquiring a smaller competitor, Dr. Pepper.
While the merger enables Coca-Cola to exercise market power (e.g., raise
price, or diminish quality, service, innovation or another important facet of
competition), Coca-Cola, given the competition from PepsiCo among
others, is not a monopolist. The difficult question then is how much buyer
power is necessary to be a monopsonist.87
Plaintiffs can prove monopsony power with direct evidence that the
buyer depressed prices below the competitive level by withholding

85

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-571 (1966); see also In re Se.
Milk Antitrust Litig., 801 F. Supp. 2d 705, 724 (E.D. Tenn. 2011) (setting out same
elements for monopsony claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act).
86
EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 29, at § 8 (noting that both suppliers
and buyers can have market power, but, for clarity, using market power to refer to a
supplier's market power, and buyer power to refer to a buyer's market power).
87
Remarks on Single Firm Conduct, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1205, 1210 (2008)
(Dennis Carlton) (noting the difficulty in making this distinction: “I mean, you can say that
monopoly power is a lot of market power, but then what do you mean by a lot? And it's not
a very precise distinction and that can cloud issues.”); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992) (“Monopoly power under § 2 [of the
Sherman Act] requires, of course, something greater than market power under § 1.”).
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purchases of goods and services.88 The problem is that direct evidence of
monopsony (or monopoly) power is rare.89 As the German competition
authorities observe, “the simple monopsony model often does not
adequately reflect the reality of procurement markets.”90
Plaintiffs typically prove market power circumstantially, with evidence
of a high market share in a properly defined market protected by entry
barriers.91 In monopolization claims, the threshold market share is typically
high.92 If courts and agencies assume that monopsony is the mirror image
88

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The
existence of monopoly power may be proven through direct evidence of supracompetitive
prices and restricted output.”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C.
Cir.2001) (en banc).
89
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 51 (observing that because direct proof of monopoly power is
“rarely available, courts more typically examine market structure in search of
circumstantial evidence of monopoly power”). The D.C. Circuit also declined to adopt a
rule requiring direct evidence to show monopoly power in any market. Id. at 57. One
reason is that rarely is there a line that clearly demarcates what a defendant would or would
not do if it possessed (or lacked) monopoly or monopsony power. Id.
90
OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 176 (Germany).
91
See, e.g., Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 51; I ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 229 (6th ed. 2007).
92
See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 91, at 231-32 (“courts virtually
never find monopoly power when market share is less than about 50 percent”); In re Se.
Milk Antitrust Litig., 801 F. Supp. 2d 705, 725 (E.D. Tenn. 2011) (citing Byars v. Bluff
City News Co., Inc., 609 F.2d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 1979) (finding that 75–80 percent or
greater is a “starting point” in assessing monopoly power); Smith Wholesale Co., 219 Fed.
Appx. at 409 (56% market share insufficient); Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc.,
980 F.2d 171, 201 (3d Cir. 1992) (55 percent share insufficient); Arthur S. Langenderfer,
Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 917 F.2d 1413, 1443 (6th Cir. 1990) (19–29 percent market shares
insufficient and “there is substantial merit in a presumption that market shares below 50 or
60% do not constitute market power” (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW,
Section 578.3 (1988 Supp.))); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424
(2d Cir. 1945) (“it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four per cent” is sufficient “and
certainly thirty-three percent is not”); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline
Co., 885 F.2d 683, 694 n. 18 (10th Cir. 1989) (“While the Supreme Court has refused to
specify a minimum market share necessary to indicate a defendant has monopoly power,
lower courts generally require a minimum market share of between 70 percent and 80
percent.”) (citing 2 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 12.6 (1980)); R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 362 (M.D.N.C. 2002), aff'd sub nom. 67
F. App'x 810 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Seventy to seventy-five per cent is generally considered the
minimum market share necessary to support a finding of monopoly power.”); but see
Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., 651 F.2d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 1981); Reazin
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., 899 F.2d 951, 968 (10th Cir. 1990); Kolon Indus.,
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of monopoly, and that a 50 percent market share is insufficient for
monopolization claims, should they similarly conclude that a 50 percent
market share is insufficient for monopsonization claims?
Some agencies and courts fall in this trap. One U.S. district court
recently dismissed a section 2 claim because the market share of around 40
percent did not meet “the threshold of what it takes to establish monopoly
or monopsony power.”93 The European Commission’s Vertical Guidelines
also treat buyers’ and sellers’ market power similarly. The Guidelines state
that the sellers’ and buyers’ market shares are “decisive” in determining if
the block exemption applies.94 So if the seller’s or buyer’s share in the
market where it sells or purchases goods or services is 30 percent or less, its
conduct, except for certain hardcore restrictions of competition, is
presumptively legal.95
One important distinction between monopoly and monopsony is the
market share needed to infer significant power.96

Retailers with a 20

percent market share can enjoy significant buyer power over sellers.97 In
Toys-“R”-Us, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, the market shares fell
below the ordinary thresholds for monopolization claims: the retailer Toys“R”-Us accounted for 20 percent of the national wholesale market and up to
49 percent of some local wholesale markets.98 The affected toy

Inc. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 3:11CV622, 2012 WL 1155218 (E.D. Va. Apr. 5,
2012) (court considers besides market share defendant’s “ability to maintain power over
pricing and competition for a significant period without erosion by new entry or
expansion”).
93
In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 801 F. Supp. 2d 705, 727 (E.D. Tenn. 2011).
94
European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010/C 130/01, ¶ 87
(2010),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/guidelines_vertical_en.pdf.
95
Id. at ¶ 23.
96
Carstensen, Buyer Power, supra note 12, at 295-96; Kirkwood, Merger, supra note
33, at 35-38.
97
Carstensen, Buyer Power, supra note 12, at 295-96.
98
221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000).
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manufacturers collectively accounted for about 40 percent of the traditional
toy market.99 Nonetheless, the FTC found, and the circuit court affirmed,
that the group boycott, which the retailer orchestrated, was having its
intended anticompetitive effect. Toys-“R”-Us “was remarkably successful
in causing the 10 major toy manufacturers to reduce output of toys to the
warehouse clubs, and that reduction in output protected [Toys-“R”-Us]
from having to lower its prices to meet the clubs’ price levels.”100 One
could distinguish Toys-“R”-Us as a group boycott, rather than a monopsony
case. Moreover, Toys-“R”-Us was not a textbook monopsonist, whereby it
purchased fewer toys to depress the market price. But that ignores the fact
that Toys-“R”-Us, despite its relatively low market share, had sufficient
buyer power to accomplish its intended anticompetitive effects.

The

retailer--without a dominant market share--was wielding its buyer power to
induce the toy manufacturers to raise the costs of its new rivals, the
warehouse clubs.
If firms can enjoy monopsony power with a market share below 50
percent, then agencies and courts cannot reflexively import the market share
thresholds from monopolization cases to monopsonization cases. Doing so
significantly increases the risk of immunizing monopsonies from antitrust
liability. The U.S. competition authorities recognize the difficulty, “in the
abstract, to state market share thresholds for such monopsony concerns.”101
Rather than rely on market share thresholds alone to find monopsony
power, they encourage the courts to consider several interrelated factors:
(1) a large market share on the part of the purchaser; (2) an upward
sloping or somewhat inelastic supply curve in the input market;
and (3) an inability or unwillingness for new purchasers to enter
the market or current purchasers to expand the amount of their
99

Id.
Id.
101
DOJ & FTC Health Report, supra note 16, at 17.

100
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purchases in the market.102
This is the correct approach. In explaining why reliance on market share
alone can be misleading,103 Professors Blair and Harrison apply the
following formula to measure the degree of buyer power (i.e., the
percentage deviation from the competitive result):


where

is the buyer’s market share,

is the elasticity of demand of the

fringe buyers, and is the overall elasticity of supply.104 From this formula,
one can see that market share is one of several interrelated factors that
determine buyer power. Indeed in defining the relevant monopsony product
and geographic markets, one should account both

and .105

In assessing whether the defendant possesses monopsony power, the
competition authority and court should consider first its market share, ,
namely the percentage share in either dollars or units of defendant’s
purchases of that input.
Next is the elasticity of fringe demand,

, which is the capacity of

alternative buyers to purchase the goods or services “without undue delay,
risk, or cost.”106 The greater the widget sellers’ difficulty in turning to other
102

Id.
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 18, at 60; Ganesh, supra note 6, at 1223; see also
Cory S. Capps, Buyer Power in Health Plan Mergers, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 375,
380, 383 (2009) (discussing how assessing buyer power in health insurance cases on the
basis of shares of patients may understate the risk of harm, given the difference in
reimbursement levels from commercially insured patients and Medicare and Medicaid
patients).
104
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 18, at 58.
105
DOJ & FTC Health Report, supra note 16, at 15 (“whether the buyers of the input
in the putative market successfully would be able to lower the price they pay for the input
or whether, instead, the sellers have sufficient realistic alternatives to allow them to
circumvent the price decrease”).
106
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 18, at 58-59; Carstensen, Buyer Power, supra note
12, at 278; 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 12 (“In defining relevant markets,
the Agencies focus on the alternatives available to sellers in the face of a decrease in the
price paid by a hypothetical monopsonist.”).
103
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buyers to purchase their widgets, the greater the defendant’s buyer
power.107 One factor is the difficulty of entry of other buyers. If the
defendant attempted to exercise monopsony power by offering too low a
price, would that likely attract sufficient entry of other buyers to timely
defeat the exercise of monopsony power?
Third is the elasticity of supply, , namely the sellers’ ability and
incentive to switch to providing other goods or services. Buyer power
depends in part on the captivity of the sellers in producing and selling that
product.108 An apple orchard owner, facing a powerful buyer, may have
fewer options than a carrot farmer, who may more readily switch to another
crop (such as beets or turnips) the following year.
To illustrate, suppose two firms in two different industries: Firm A has
a 60 percent market share; Firm B has a 40 percent market share. If

and

are the same in both industries, then we can conclude that Firm A enjoys
more buyer power in its industry than Firm B in its industry. But if we
change the values of

and , then Firm B, despite its lower market share,

can enjoy greater buyer power.
Suppose in Firm A’s industry,
•

•

107

2, in that the elasticity of demand of the fringe buyers is greater
as they are willing to buy more of the sellers’ products should Firm
A lower its purchase price, and
2, in that sellers, if Firm A lower its price, can more readily
switch from producing widgets to other things.

If “the equation for measuring market power in monopsony is a mirror image of the
relationships that create market power in a seller[],” then a “greater availability of
substitute buyers indicates a smaller quantum of market power on the part of the buyers in
question.” Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 202 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T Inc., CIV.A. 11-1600
ESH, 2011 WL 5188081 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2011).
108
2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 12 (“Market power on the buying side
of the market is not a significant concern if suppliers have numerous attractive outlets for
their goods or services.”).
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Firm B, despite its lower market share, now enjoys greater buyer power
than Firm A if the elasticity of demand of the fringe buyers and the
elasticity of supply are lower (say if both

and equal 1).

These three interrelated factors were evident in a recent DOJ action. In
2011, George’s Foods acquired Tyson Foods’ Harrisonburg, Virginia
chicken processing plant.109 George’s and Tyson were two of the region’s
three chicken processors that competed in producing, processing, and
distributing chickens raised for meat products (“broilers”).

Post-

acquisition, George’s would control “approximately 43% of chicken
processing capacity in the Shenandoah Valley, with only one other
remaining competitor, Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation.”110 The DOJ alleged
that the acquisition would lead to monopsony power.111 George’s could
reduce below competitive levels the prices it paid to Shenandoah Valley
area farmers who raised chickens for processors such as Tyson Foods and
George’s.
The antitrust plaintiff to prevail under section 7 of the Clayton Act must
prove that the effect of the merger “may be substantially to lessen
competition or to tend to create a monopoly.”112 In proving the former, the
DOJ need not prove a merger to monopsony. Here the DOJ alleged a
merger to monopsony, and did so without relying on market share alone. If
the antitrust agency and court simply assume that monopsonies are the
mirror image of monopolies, they would conclude that George’s, with a 43
percent market share, is not a monopsony.
But the DOJ properly considered the other interrelated factors. It first
considered the industry’s inelastic supply:
109

Compl., George’s, supra note 14.
Id. at ¶ 4.
111
Competitive Impact Statement, George’s, supra note 14, at 6 (“in short, the
Transaction would lead George’s to exercise monopsony power”).
112
15 U.S.C. § 18 (emphasis added).
110
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In order to enter the chicken growing business, growers make
significant investments that are highly specific to broiler
production. They must build chicken houses that may cost from
$100,000 to $300,000, and have a 30-year economic life. Many
growers take out substantial loans in order to make these
investments. Chicken houses have no practical alternative use. If
a grower were to stop raising chickens, his or her best option
would likely be to raze the chicken-raising facilities because
converting a chicken house to a house suitable for another use
involves substantial expense. For instance, converting a chicken
house to one suitable for turkey growing can cost more than
$100,000. Most chicken farmers would not abandon their
investments in chicken houses in response to small decreases in the
prices and other contract terms they receive for their services.113
Next the DOJ considered the inelasticity of demand of fringe buyers.
Post-acquisition the market’s remaining processor lacked “sufficient
capacity to take on significant numbers of growers if George’s were to
depress payments to growers.”114
Finally the DOJ considered the difficulty in entering the broiler chicken
processing industry:
New entry into the production and sale of broiler chickens is costly
and time consuming. Construction of a large-scale chicken
processing facility would require investment of at least $35 million
and take two or more years to obtain necessary permits, plan,
design, and build. In addition, there are significant costs and
inefficiencies associated with the start-up period of a new chicken
processing facility. Repositioning by firms or facilities that
slaughter primarily turkeys would require additional capital
investment. Moreover, a turkey processor seeking to add chicken
products to its offering would first need to find customers for its
output prior to contracting with growers.115
Entry therefore would be neither likely, timely nor sufficient to defeat a
small but significant, non-transitory decrease in the price of broiler grower
113

Compl., George’s, supra note 14, at ¶ 21.
Id. at ¶¶ 6, 28.
115
Id. at ¶ 30.

114
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services.
Consequently, courts and agencies can lessen the risk of false negatives
by looking beyond market share thresholds. Depending on the elasticity of
demand of the fringe buyers   and overall supply  , firms with
relatively low market shares can enjoy as much, if not greater, buyer power
than firms with higher market shares. Although George’s market share may
not suggest monopsony power (if one simply applied the thresholds used in
monopolization cases116), George’s nonetheless could “decrease prices or
degrade contract terms to farmers for grower services in that region.”117
The issue of false positives, however, remains. Monopsonists can have
low market shares, but many buyers with low market shares are not
monopsonists. Likewise all monopsonists possess buyer power, but not all
firms with buyer power are monopsonists. “Indeed,” observed the U.S.
competition authorities, “because one of the purposes of managed care is to
lower prices closer to a competitive level, it can be difficult to determine
when a managed care purchaser is exercising monopsony power.”118
Reduction in sellers’ output is not the telltale mark of monopsony, as
buyers, for example, can price discriminate. Quantifying

and

can be

119

elusive, difficult, and contentious.

116

One could argue that market share thresholds are arbitrary for both monopsony and
monopoly claims. Indeed the same factors to show George’s monopsony power, despite its
relatively low market share, could show that a firm had monopoly power. In other words,
when the elasticity of supply by fringe sellers and the elasticity of consumer demand are
both low, a firm with a 43 percent market share could also exercise monopoly power.
Plaintiffs, however, rarely challenge the market share thresholds per se. Instead the litigants
debate whether the market should be defined more broadly or narrowly. Nonetheless even
in properly defined markets, buyers with low market shares at times can exert tremendous
power. Maybe buyers, in their ability in deciding when, whether, from whom, and how
much to buy, generally have relatively more power than sellers; thus buyers can more
effectively discipline sellers from exercising market power, than sellers can discipline
buyers.
117
Compl., supra note 14, at ¶¶ 6, 28.
118
DOJ & FTC Health Report, supra note 16, at 18.
119
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 18, at 66.
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Therefore in assessing monopsony claims, agencies and courts should
use a sliding scale: the lower the alleged monopsonist’s market share, the
greater the plaintiff’s burden in showing the (i) fringe buyers’ inability to
acquire more of the sellers’ output and (ii) sellers’ lack of alternatives to
selling in the affected market (being unable to easily and cheaply produce
and sell other products).120 Granted this is, at times, a matter of degree.
The defendant can be a “hard-nosed actor in the market,”121 but not a
monopsonist.

So a rule of thumb is the buyer’s coercion.

implicitly incorporates both

Coercion

and : as the sellers’ price is depressed, there

remain few alternative buyers or alternative selling opportunities to rescue
the sellers from exploitation and their captivity to the buyer. The more the
evidence shows that the defendant is forcing the seller “to do something that
he would not do in a competitive market,” the more likely the defendant is a
monopsonist, even when the defendant’s market share is relatively low.122
The stronger the evidence of the buyer’s coercion, the stronger the inference
of monopsony.
B. Proving Exclusionary or Predatory Conduct
Monopsony, by itself, does not violate section 2 of the Sherman Act.123
A monopsonist, like a monopolist, “may be the survivor out of a group of
active competitors, merely by virtue of [its] superior skill, foresight and
industry.”124 A monopsonist, like a monopolist, in America can underpay
its suppliers, overcharge its customers, provide inferior service and poor
quality goods, be inefficient, and not innovate.125
120

Id.
In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 801 F. Supp. 2d 705, 727 (E.D. Tenn. 2011)
122
PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 817 (6th Cir. 1997).
123
White Mule Co. v. ATC Leasing Co. LLC, 540 F. Supp. 2d 869, 888 (N.D. Ohio
2008) (“Possession of monopsony power, like possession of monopoly power, is not an
antitrust violation in and of itself,” citing BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 18, at 307);
Salop, supra note 22, at 675.
124
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
125
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
121
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Because the Sherman Act does not prohibit monopsony power by itself,
the next challenge is determining whether the defendant sought to attain or
maintain its monopsony by exclusionary and predatory conduct. If the
monopsonist, for example, is attempting to exclude rival purchasers on
some basis other than efficiency, then courts likely will characterize the
behavior as predatory or exclusionary.126
Because few monopsony cases have been brought, what constitutes
exclusionary

and

predatory monopsony

behavior

remains

largely

unexplored. One interesting development will be the extent to which courts
use the legal standards developed for monopolization claims (e.g.,
evaluating a monopolist’s tying, exclusive dealing, and refusal to deal) for
monopsonization claims. But as this Article discusses, monopsony is not
the mirror image of monopoly. So one can expect unique monopsonization
theories, such as “naked overbuying,” where the defendant raises its rivals’
costs by purchasing (or manipulating the purchase price of) an input that its
rivals, but not defendant, use in their production process.127
In devising any legal standard for evaluating monopsony claims, the
critical

threshold

issue is

what

harm

counts. As

the German

Bundeskartellamt observed, one must discuss abuses of buyer power in
terms of the basic objectives of competition law.128 Part III addresses
whether courts and agencies should reconcile abuse of monopsony power
claims with a consumer welfare objective. Must antitrust plaintiffs prove
harm to downstream consumers?
III. USING CONSUMER WELFARE TO SCREEN MONOPSONY CLAIMS
The OECD proposes that agencies and courts use consumer harm as a

398, 407 (2004).
126
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
127
Salop, supra note 22, at 683-84 (raising and discussing naked overbuying).
128
OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 175 (Germany).
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threshold screen for buyer power claims.129 As it explained, “[r]eductions
in input prices in the case of bargaining power are typically beneficial, so
requiring an explanation of how increases in bargaining power would harm
downstream consumers will help to avoid inadvertently deterring procompetitive behavior.”130 The European Commission likewise observed
that “the ultimate end user of any product—the consumer—should be the
centre of competition law.”131 The OECD and EC believe that predicting
whether an increase in buyer power will have positive or negative effects is
difficult. To avoid chilling a monopsonist’s pro-competitive behavior,
agencies and courts should use consumer harm as a screen, namely that the
upstream buyer’s conduct adversely affects the end consumer.
Consumer welfare is indeed a popular antitrust objective.132 Thirty of
thirty-three countries in a 2007 ICN survey identified promoting consumer
welfare as an objective for their monopolization statutes.133 The EC noted
how, “over the past two decades, the Commission’s antitrust and merger
policy more effectively placed the emphasis on consumer welfare, notably
through an increasingly refined economic analysis.”134
But there are many problems with consumer welfare as the primary or
sole antitrust goal. Monopsony only highlights the infirmities.

129

Id. at 10 (Executive Summary).
Id. at 9 (Executive Summary).
131
Id. at 255 (European Commission).
132
Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 570-71
(2012); J. Thomas Rosch, Monopsony and the Meaning of “Consumer Welfare”: A Closer
Look at Weyerhaeuser, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 353, 353-54 (2007).
133
Int’l Competition Network, Report on the Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws,
Assessment of Dominance/Substantial Market Power, and State-Created Monopolies 9
(2007),
available
at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf.
Consumer
welfare was the second most popular antitrust goal, trailing the goal of ensuring an
effective competitive process, and ahead of the goals, maximising efficiency and ensuring
economic freedom.
134
European Commission, Report on Competition Policy 2010, COM(2011)328 final,
at 5 (2011), available at ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/index.html.
130
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A. Why Doesn’t the Key Proponent of the Consumer Welfare Objective Use
a Consumer Welfare Screen?
Some United States courts135 and scholars136 in the past thirty years have
been cheering globally for consumer welfare as antitrust’s primary
objective. But the quest in the United States over the past 30 years for a
single economic objective was, as I discuss elsewhere, a failure.137 One
need only look at monopsony power to see why.
The U.S. courts, shortly after the Sherman Act’s enactment, recognized
harm to sellers, independent of any harm to downstream consumers. One
early antitrust prosecution was against stockyard owners that bought and
slaughtered livestock into fresh meats for human consumption.138 The
defendants directed their purchasing agents at the stockyards “to refrain
from bidding against each other when making purchases of such livestock,
and by these means inducing and compelling the owners of such livestock
to sell the same at less prices than they would receive if such bidding were

135

Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993)
(noting “antitrust laws’ traditional concern for consumer welfare and price competition”);
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (“Congress
designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription’” (quoting Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979))); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v.
Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983) (observing that antitrust laws
“assure customers the benefits of price competition”); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,
501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 2007) (“primary goal of antitrust law is to maximize consumer
welfare by promoting competition among firms); L.A.P.D., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 132
F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Antitrust law is designed to protect consumers from the
higher prices—and society from the reduction in allocative efficiency— that occurs when
firms with market power curtail output.”); Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d
1421, 1444–45 & n.15 (9th Cir. 1995) (characterizing allocative efficiency as synonymous
with consumer welfare and as “the central goal of the Sherman Act”); J. Allen Ramey,
M.D., Inc. v. Pac. Found. For Med. Care, 999 F. Supp. 1355, 1364 (S.D. Cal. 1998);
Ginzburg v. Mem’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 998, 1015 (S.D. Tex. 1997)
(“’purpose of antitrust law is the promotion of consumer welfare’”) (quoting Reazin v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 960 (10th Cir. 1990))).
136
See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 91 (1978).
137
Stucke, Goals, supra note 132, at 563-95.
138
United States v. Swift & Co., 122 F. 529 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1903) modified, 196 U.S.
375 (1905).
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But the fact that consumer surplus increased did not

excuse the bid-rigging:
Indeed, combination that leads directly to lower prices to the
consumer may, within the doctrine of these cases, even as against
the consumer, be restraint of trade; and combination that leads
directly to higher prices, may, as against the producer be restraint
of trade. The statute, thus interpreted, has no concern with prices,
but looks solely to competition, and to the giving of competition
full play, by making illegal any effort at restriction upon
competition. Whatever combination has the direct and necessary
effect of restricting competition, is, within the meaning of the
Sherman Act as now interpreted, restraint of trade.140
Likewise, the Supreme Court in 1948 held that the Sherman Act applies
to buyer cartels that injure only sellers, and not customers or consumers.141
The Sherman Act “does not confine its protection to consumers, or to
purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it immunize the
outlawed acts because they are done by any of these.”142 The Act “is
comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made
victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.”143
Even outside of cartel cases, courts are reluctant to apply a consumer
welfare screen. As one lower court said,
This contention—questionable even in the monopoly context
[citation omitted]—certainly cannot apply to monopsony claims.
See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, et. al., Antitrust Law
¶ 350b (2007) (“Notwithstanding numerous statements to the
effect that the primary or even exclusive concern of antitrust is
‘consumer’ welfare, upstream, or monopsony, injury to suppliers is
treated in largely the same way as injury to consumers.”). In
contrast to a monopoly, in a monopsony the buyer uses its market
power to damage competition among upstream market participants.
In such a situation, the direct victims are competitors and suppliers
139

Swift & Co., 122 F. at 530.
Id. at 534.
141
Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235-36 (1948).
142
Id. at 236.
143
Id.

140
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rather than competitors and customers.144
Similarly, the U.S. antitrust agencies do not use consumer harm to
screen mergers.145 To dispel any uncertainty, the 2010 Merger Guidelines
provide an example of an illegal merger that does not directly harm
consumers:
Example 24: Merging Firms A and B are the only two buyers in the relevant
geographic market for an agricultural product. Their merger will enhance buyer
power and depress the price paid to farmers for this product, causing a transfer
of wealth from farmers to the merged firm and inefficiently reducing supply.
These effects can arise even if the merger will not lead to any increase in the
146
price charged by the merged firm for its output.

The U.S. agencies prosecute mergers to monopsony that affect solely
suppliers, and not consumers:
In Cargill,147 the Division challenged a merger that would have
created a monopsony purchaser of grain in some local markets.
The merging companies, however, sold grain in world markets, in
which they faced competition from many other grain sellers. Thus,
even if the merged firms imposed a loss on farmers by cutting back
the quantity of grain they bought from them, consumers of the
merging companies would not be harmed because they had
numerous other sources of supply. The harm in the upstream
144

White Mule Co. v. ATC Leasing Co. LLC, 540 F. Supp. 2d 869, 888 (N.D. Ohio

2008).
145

See, e.g., 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 12 (“Nor do the Agencies
evaluate the competitive effects of mergers between competing buyers strictly, or even
primarily, on the basis of effects in the downstream markets in which the merging firms
sell.”). The Guidelines do state that efficiencies must be “sufficient to reverse the merger’s
potential to harm customers in the relevant market.” Id. at § 10. But assuming that this
applies to mergers between buyers, a consumer-oriented efficiencies defense does not mean
that the Clayton Act prohibits only mergers that harm consumers. The latter does not
follow from the former, and there is no need for symmetry between the two. The
efficiencies defense simply elevates the harm to consumers over potential efficiency
benefits to producers in mergers; the efficiencies defense is not intended to discount the
harm (or possibility of harm) to other producers arising in mergers.
146
Id. at § 12.
147
Compl., United States v. Cargill Inc. & Continental Grain Co., Civ. Act. No.
1:99CV01875
(GK)
(D.D.C.
filed
July
8,
1999),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f2500/2552.htm.
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market, however, was sufficient to prompt the Division to
challenge the merger.148
So why doesn’t the United States--a leading cheerleader of the
consumer welfare objective--advocate a consumer welfare screen for buyer
power claims? Several explanations exist.
First, the Sherman Act, like some other jurisdictions’ antitrust statutes,
does not expressly identify consumer welfare as the primary objective or
require the agencies to use consumer welfare as a screen.149
Second, the legislators in enacting the Sherman Act were concerned
about buyer power’s adverse impact on sellers, apart from any injury to
consumers.150
Third, a consumer welfare screen produces anomalous results. If the
U.S. courts required the antitrust plaintiff to prove consumer harm in cases
involving buyer power, otherwise per se illegal, and criminally prosecuted,
behavior would become per se legal. A bid-rigging cartel composed of

148

DOJ & FTC Health Report, supra note 16, at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).
INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT AND CONSUMER
WELFARE—SETTING THE AGENDA 15 (2011), available at http://www.icnthehague.org/page.php?id=78 [hereinafter 2011 ICN Survey] (24% of the 54 agencies
surveyed reported that legislation does not mention consumer welfare; 28% responded that
legislation indirectly refers to consumer welfare).
150
Senator Sherman said,
These trusts and combinations are great wrongs to the people. They have invaded
many of the most important branches of business. They operate with a double-edged
sword. They increase beyond reason the costs of the necessaries of life and business,
and they decrease the cost of the raw material, the farm products of the country. They
regulate prices at their will, depress the price of what they buy and increase the price
of what they sell. They aggregate to themselves great, enormous wealth by extortion
which makes the people poor. Then, making this extorted wealth the means of further
extortion from their unfortunate victims, the people of the United States, they pursue
unmolested, unrestrained by law, their ceaseless round of peculation under the law,
until they are fast producing that condition in our people in which the great mass of
them are the servitors of those, who have this aggregated wealth at their command.
21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890); see also Gregory J. Werden, Monopsony and the Sherman
Act: Consumer Welfare in A New Light, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 707, 714 (2007) (“The
legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended to protect sellers victimized by
trusts and other conduct within the scope of the Sherman Act's prohibitions.”).
149
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ultimate buyers, for example, would be per se legal, while their counterpart
sellers, if they colluded, would be incarcerated and fined. Not surprisingly
the United States does not distinguish between buyer and seller cartels, and
actively prosecutes buyer cartels without considering their impact on
consumers.151
Although U.S. courts mention consumer welfare as an antitrust
objective, in reality, the courts are more concerned about preserving
competition.152 This raises other issues, including what is competition, as

151

OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 247 (United States) (noting how DOJ brought
70 criminal cases against buyer cartels between 1997-2006); see also Vogel v. Am. Soc. of
Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1984) (“buyer cartels, the object of which is to
force the prices that suppliers charge the members of the cartel below the competitive level,
are illegal per se”); Int'l Outsourcing Services, LLC v. Blistex, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 860,
865 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (complaint “sets forth a horizontal price fixing scheme among buyers
to fix the prices of an input-shipping costs for coupons-below its competitive cost” and
“sufficiently alleges conduct prohibited per se by the Sherman Act”).
152
Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2000):
The fallacy of this argument [that collusive bid rigging legal because lower
consumer prices ensued] becomes clear when we recall that the central purpose
of the antitrust laws, state and federal, is to preserve competition. It is
competition-not the collusive fixing of prices at levels either low or high-that
these statutes recognize as vital to the public interest. The Supreme Court's
references to the goals of achieving “the lowest prices, the highest quality and
the greatest material progress,” [N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4
(1958)], and of “assur[ing] customers the benefits of price competition,”
[Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983)], do not mean that conspiracies among buyers to
depress acquisition prices are tolerated. Every precedent in the field makes clear
that the interaction of competitive forces, not price-rigging, is what will benefit
consumers. “[O]ur prior cases,” the Court noted in Associated General, “have
emphasized the central interest in protecting the economic freedom of
participants in the relevant market.” 459 U.S. at 538, 103 S.Ct. 897. In
California, similarly, “The public interest requires free competition so that prices
be not dependent upon an understanding among suppliers of any given
commodity, but upon the interplay of the economic forces of supply and
demand.” Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal.2d 34, 44, 172 P.2d 867
(1946).
See also W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 105 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“Highmark’s improperly motivated exercise of monopsony power, like the collusive
exercise of oligopsony power by the cheese makers in Knevelbaard, was anticompetitive
and cannot be defended on the sole ground that it enabled Highmark to set lower premiums
on its insurance plans.”).
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the term is not self-defining, and what are the goals of competition law.153
Recent buyer power cases, to the extent they state a specific goal, describe it
as protecting suppliers from artificially low prices.154
B. Disagreement over Consumer Welfare
A skeptic can reply that the fact that the United States does not apply a
consumer welfare screen does not mean the screen is undesirable. The
United States simply is misguided.
As I elaborate elsewhere, consumer welfare remains one of antitrust’s
most abused terms.155 No consensus exists in the United States or globally
on what consumer welfare actually means, who the consumers are, how to
measure consumer welfare (if it is indeed measurable), or how to design
legal standards to further this goal.156 Although one recent ICN survey of
its member countries found “some agreement” on a consumer welfare
objective,157 the ICN surveys also found that most countries did “not
specifically define consumer welfare and appear[ed] to have different
economic understandings of the term.”158 The ICN surveys suggest that the

153

Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Competition, 81 MISS. L.J. 107 (2011).
For example, the Ninth Circuit recently quoted earlier case law of how “Congress
designed the Sherman Act as a consumer welfare prescription.” California ex rel. Harris v.
Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442
U.S. 330, 343 931 (1979)). But the court recognized that harm transcends the consumer:
“Congress sought to ensure that competitors not cut deals aimed at stifling competition and
at permitting higher prices to be charged to consumers than would be expected in a
competitive environment, or permitting lower prices to be paid to those from whom
competitors bought materials than a fair market rate.” Id. Judge Reinhardt, in a separate
opinion, dissenting in part and concurring in part, bluntly rejected the defendants’
justification that driving down their workers’ compensation was somehow a
“procompetitive” benefit: “The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that because
antitrust law operates to correct all distortions of competition, it condemns market actors
who distort competition, whether on the buyer side or seller side.” Id. at 1161; see also
West Penn, 627 F.3d at 105 (concluding that “paying [the plaintiff] artificially depressed
reimbursement rates was an anticompetitive aspect of the alleged conspiracy”).
155
Stucke, Goals, supra note 132, at 570-77.
156
Id.
157
2011 ICN Survey, supra note 149, at 14.
158
INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON THE OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERAL
CONDUCT LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER, AND
154
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phrase “promoting consumer welfare,” provides little guidance as an
antitrust goal.159 A former FTC Chair concluded the same:
[T]he concept of “consumer welfare” and the principle of
protecting “competition, not competitors” are so open-ended that
their true meaning in practice depends on how they are applied. It
is a relatively barren exercise for EU and US officials to invoke
these phrases without taking the further difficult step of achieving
agreement on what these phrases mean.160
Consequently, it is illogical to advocate a consumer welfare screen given
the current disagreement over what consumer welfare means, whether the
agencies “examine effects on either or both of the direct customers and the
final consumers,”161 and how consumer welfare is promoted.162
C. Risk of False Negatives under a Consumer Welfare Screen
Even if competition authorities could overcome these obstacles, could
agree on a definition of consumer welfare, say maximizing consumer
surplus, and could identify the consumer whose surplus must be maximized,
applying the consumer welfare screen remains problematic. Proving harm
to consumers is often difficult on the selling side—especially for
intermediary goods.163

Proving buyer power’s adverse impact on the

ultimate consumer is even more problematic and difficult.164
A consumer welfare screen, when actually applied, provides an
STATE-CREATED MONOPOLIES 9 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 ICN Report], available at
http://www. internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf; see also
2011 ICN Survey, supra note 149, at 4.
159
2011 ICN Survey, supra note 149, at 3 (noting “connection between consumer
welfare and the practical enforcement of competition law is not always straightforward”
and that “there may be a considerable gap between policy statements and practice”).
160
William E. Kovacic, Chairman, US Federal Trade Comm’n, Competition Policy in
the European Union and the United States: Convergence or Divergence?, Bates White Fifth
Annual
Antitrust
Conference
9
(June
2,
2008),
available
at
wwwftcgov/speeches/kovacic/080602bateswhitepdf.
161
2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 1.
162
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incomplete and distorted assessment of consumer harm. Antitrust enforcers
typically consider the challenged behavior’s impact on short-term pricing
effects.165 If retail prices are unchanged (or declining), then the competition
authority, under a consumer harm screen, would likely conclude that the
challenged practice is competitively neutral or pro-competitive. They would
unlikely investigate further the complaints over buyer power, and would
likely dismiss any non-price concerns as too tenuous or speculative.166
This brings us to the fundamental difficulty in measuring consumer
welfare. As Subparts I.C and D discuss, buyer power can harm consumers,
albeit indirectly, such as farmers who have less money to purchase goods
that consumers produce and the increase in negative externalities when
farmers with tighter margins cut corners by polluting more, engaging in less
sustainable farming, allowing a more dangerous workplace, and hiring
underage or illegal aliens.

Competition authorities generally do not

consider these other harder-to-quantify harms, which may exceed the shortterm benefits from lower prices.167

The authorities are not willfully

ignorant. Rather they lack the tools to assess the short- and long-term
harms arising from buyer power (e.g., higher prices, less variety, less
innovation).168 Thus if a Wal-Mart depresses wages in a local community,
which in turn increases the taxpayers’ costs, would that be factored in the
agency’s consumer welfare screen? Unlikely.
Accordingly, given the difficulty in proving and quantifying consumer
harm, the agency would use a simple, but incomplete, measure. The agency
assumes that monopsony power “usually results in higher prices
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downstream.”169 Absent evidence of supra-competitive retail prices, the
agency concludes that the challenged behavior is pro-competitive or
competitively neutral. This heuristic—assessing the restraint’s short-term
impact on retail prices--increases the risk of false negatives. It also leaves
many consumers, who are also sellers, unprotected: “If competition policy
is consistently focused on the welfare of the end consumer, those suppliers
disadvantaged by buyer power could now and then find themselves in a
rather defenceless position.”170
D. Risk of False Positives under a Consumer Welfare Screen
As Subpart III.C shows, a consumer welfare screen, if narrowly applied,
increases the risk of false negatives.

The screen excuses monopsony

behavior that reduces, albeit indirectly, consumer welfare.
One risk is that courts and agencies, confronted with a monopsonist’s
unfair and abusive conduct, will construe consumer welfare so loosely that
it serves more as a general principle than a standard to guide the instant
analysis.171
One economist stated that in most cases, “monopsony harms consumers
because the distortions it creates in an input market reduce efficiency in
final goods markets.”172 The OECD agrees.173 If true, then a consumer
welfare screen is superfluous. If the court finds that the defendant is a
monopsony, and if monopsony power and its willful maintenance usually
harm downstream consumers, then the key issue is whether the defendant is
a monopsony. The absence of direct evidence of consumer harm is not
169
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determinative if one assumes that monopsony power and its willful
maintenance ultimately harm consumers.

Consumers are (or will be)

harmed, but the harm is not readily observable or measurable. So in finding
that the defendant has enough buyer power to be a monopsonist, the court
or agency can conclude that consumers are somehow harmed. The screen
serves no real function.
But monopsony, while harming sellers, does not always harm
consumers.

Even here, courts, concerned about the monopsonist’s

behavior, can hypothesize a string of future events leading to consumer
harm: The exercise of buyer power enables the defendant to lower its
wholesale price, which significantly disadvantages defendant’s competitors,
prompts their exit from the market, lessens competition over the long-term,
and harms consumers.174 Alternatively, the court can rely on the waterbed
effect as its theory of consumer harm: Buyer power nets lower prices or
better terms for some firms but results in higher wholesale prices (or worse
terms) for less powerful buyers, which in turn causes prices to increase
downstream to the detriment of consumers.175
One

problem

is

predicting

the

subsequent

anticompetitive

consequences. A defendant may use its buyer power to raise its rivals’
costs and increase its price accordingly; alternatively, the defendant lowers
its retail price to squeeze out its competitors and take greater profits later.
So under the waterbed effect, retail prices to consumers in the short-term
may decrease, increase, or remain unchanged.176
Courts and agencies plausibly can find consumer harm from the
exercise of buyer power in the form of less innovation, lower quality goods,
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and less variety.177 With smaller margins, sellers have less incentive or
ability to invest.178 If the powerful buyer captures Ricardian rents from the
more efficient sellers, these sellers likely will testify of their disincentive to
innovate, thereby harming downstream consumers. Agencies and courts
can reasonably find that lower “input prices may slow the rate of innovation
and the adoption of socially desirable product improvements.”179 With allor-nothing contracts, “the inability to capture gains from innovative
contributions to efficiency in production creates a disincentive to enter,
expand, or innovate within the production sector.”180
Other courts and agencies could plausibly conclude the opposite. By
squeezing its suppliers and retarding innovation upstream, a monopsonist
can increase the risk of being displaced by a superior innovation.181 Also
attempts to squeeze sellers of their Ricardian rents increases the sellers’
incentives to differentiate their products and increase consumer demand for
their branded product.182 The prospect of smaller margins would encourage
sellers to invest in innovations that make them less dependent on the
monopsony. Moreover, powerful buyers, if rational, would want sellers to
invest in innovations that likely increase buyer’s profits.183 Or to the extent
the powerful buyers face rival technologies or competitors, they would not
want to squeeze sellers’ margins below competitive levels.

Ford, for

example, would not want to squeeze the margins of its automobile
177
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component suppliers, if doing so disadvantages Ford competitively against
General Motors and Toyota.
Consequently, jurisdictions should not use consumer welfare to screen
monopsony claims. Contrary to its aim, a consumer welfare screen, when
applied, increases, rather than decreases, the risks and costs of false
positives and negatives. Rather than bring the monopsony legal standards
closer to the rule of law, the screen promotes greater subjectivity and less
predictability and transparency. It increases the difficulty for a generalist
court to predict with confidence the eventual effects on consumer
welfare.184
E. Behavioral Economics and Monopsony
The OECD’s consumer harm screen implicitly assumes that market
participants are interested primarily in maximizing their wealth. Despite
this simplifying assumption, subparts III.C and D show the practical
difficulties in using consumer welfare as a threshold screen for monopsony
cases. The screen’s deficiencies are compounded as courts and agencies
shift from the archaic assumption of self-interest to the more realistic
premise, namely consumers’ other-regarding behavior and their concerns
over fairness.
The consumer harm screen implicitly assumes that consumers are solely
concerned about promoting their self-interest; this consumers are harmed,
when they pay a higher price, get poorer quality goods, etc. So when
powerful meat packers earn supra-competitive profits by paying local
farmers prices below the competitive level, absent evidence of higher retail
prices, selfish consumers do not care. Nor would selfish consumers care
whether an Indonesian coffee grower receives a fair price for her harvest,
has safe working conditions, enjoys a living wage, and has the right to
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organize. Selfish consumers do not care whether the farmers’ families can
“eat better, keep their kids in school, improve [their] health and housing,
and invest in the future.”185

Selfish consumers would not differentiate

between Fair Trade coffee and regular (exploited farmer) coffee. Given the
pervasive greed, companies would not devote time and resources to ensure
that the upstream coffee farmers earned higher than the minimum wage,
received paid sick leave, had their school age children attending school, had
not converted any natural forest habitat to coffee production areas, used
organic matter or cover crops to improve or maintain soil fertility, or
processed waste so as to not contaminate the local environment.186
Responding to self-interested consumers, companies would seek to obtain
the minimum acceptable quality inputs at the lowest possible cost. A coffee
house, for example, would not pursue a goal of having all of their coffee to
be third-party verified or certified (through Coffee and Farmer Equity
(C.A.F.E.) Practices, Fairtrade, or another externally audited systems),187
when selfish consumers simply want a cheaper latte.
Consumers, as the behavioral economics literature shows, are not solely
concerned about promoting their economic self-interest. Today fairness and
other-regarding behavior are hot topics among economists188 and
lawyers.189 The psychological and experimental economic evidence shows
185
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that people care about treating others, and being treated, fairly.190 This
“strong reciprocity” in human behavior entails “a predisposition to
cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of
cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that
these costs will be repaid either by others or at a later date.”191 Employers,
for example, may not reduce wages during times of deflation as workers
perceive this wage reduction as unfair, and retaliate by working less hard.192
So rather than self-interest, employers appeal to fairness concerns.193
Likewise, in the behavioral experiments, people care about resources
being equitably distributed, not solely about resources going to those with
the greater use.194 The experiments in bargaining settings, economist
Samuel Bowles summarizes, systematically show “that substantial fractions
of most populations adhere to moral rules, willingly give to others, and
punish those who offend standards of appropriate behavior, even at a cost to

the sense of fairness fundamental to distributive justice is rooted in humans’ emotional
processing”).
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themselves and with no expectation of material reward.”195
Consumers are angrier and more willing to punish corporate behavior
perceived as intentional, unfair, and motivated by greed.196 Even if one
assumes that firms seek primarily to maximize wealth, consumers
nonetheless consider whether the firm intentionally exploits others.197
Suppose a retailer violated a pricing norm by charging higher prices to
purchasers willing to pay more.

Such price discrimination, one study

found, led to “specifically lower perceived fairness of the pricing, lower
benevolence trust towards the firm, lower intention to purchase from this
retailer, [and] higher likelihood of additional search” on competing retailer
websites.198

Even when one study’s participants personally received a

better price than other customers who were exploited, the participants still
perceived the retailer as behaving unfairly, were less inclined to purchase
from that retailer again, and less willing to recommend the retailer to a
friend.199
So the behavioral economics literature can better explain why firms
195
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avoid behavior or statements that suggest intentional exploitation.

If

consumers believe the company is exploiting its workers or suppliers, they
can punish the corporate behavior—simply at times by taking their business
elsewhere. Indeed Senator Sherman assumed that competition checked the
selfishness of firms and their disregard of consumers’ interests.200

In

competitive markets, firms would be sensitive to social norms of fairness,
and promote employee behavior that abided by these values.201 A positive
reputation can provide a competitive advantage.202
If firms are exploiting their workers or suppliers, then many consumers
either (i) are unaware of the exploitation, (ii) do not care, or (iii) do care, but
they, like the sellers, lack sufficient competitive alternatives. Consumer
ambivalence (option ii) is hard to reconcile with the behavioral experiments
and today’s marketplace. Although consumers can economically benefit
from the exploitation of sellers, they nonetheless object to such
exploitation.203 We see this with Nike, Apple, and the growth of Fair Trade
products:
In 2011, Fair Trade USA and our industry partners delivered
record impact to producers. Imports of Fair Trade Certified
products grew to an all time high, satisfying the continued growth
in consumer demand for the more than 11,000 products carrying
our label in supermarkets, cafés, universities and workplaces. This
growth was driven by longstanding business partners that
200
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expanded their Fair Trade offerings as well as by new businesses
joining us for the first time. In addition, consumer demand
continued to grow, enabled by our consumer education campaigns
which bring together brands, retailers, non-profits and community
organizations. For example, during our annual Fair Trade Month
promotion in October, Fair Trade USA and our partners actively
engaged nearly 30 million consumers through various campaign
activities, reinforcing the message that everyday purchases have
the power to improve lives and protect the environment.204
Consequently, to the extent consumers include in their welfare calculus the
fair treatment of others, including upstream suppliers, then a consumer
welfare screen, if realistic, must incorporate consumers’ other-regarding
behavior and their concern over the exploitation of others.
F. Shared Value
Subpart III.E assumes fairness as demand driven: Self-interested firms
respond to consumer pressure to treat upstream suppliers fairly.

If

unchecked by consumers or competition, the firms naturally would exploit
their suppliers. But business professor Michael Porter and consultant Mark
Kramer recently discussed fairness as a supply driven response to yield
greater profits.205 In the past, the concepts of sustainability, fairness, and
profitability generally were seen as conflicting. Under the neoclassical
approach, companies “commoditize and exert maximum bargaining power
on suppliers to drive down prices—even when purchasing from small
businesses or subsistence-level farmers.”206 So the monopsonist, given the
opportunity, would extract Ricardian rents from its more efficient suppliers
and quasi-rents from its suppliers with lower short-run costs.
One conundrum is that this exploitation makes little sense in the long
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run.207 In extracting these rents, the monopsonist can retard innovation and
investment and jeopardize its long-term competitiveness. This exploitation,
Porter and Kramer explain, destroys shared value. Rather than zero-sum
competition, whereby the monopsonist gains when its suppliers’ profits
dwindle, they argue that greater profits can be achieved in “creating
economic value . . . for society by addressing its needs and challenges” and
“enhanc[ing] the competitiveness of a company while simultaneously
advancing the economic and social conditions in the communities in which
it operates.”208

Under their concept of shared value, powerful buyers

recognize why exploitation is inconsistent with their long-term viability and
profitability. In promoting shared value, buyers recognize
that marginalized suppliers cannot remain productive or sustain,
much less improve, their quality. By increasing access to inputs,
sharing technology, and providing financing, companies can
improve supplier quality and productivity while ensuring access to
growing volume. Improving productivity will often trump lower
prices. As suppliers get stronger, their environmental impact often
falls dramatically, which further improves their efficiency.
In the context of buyer power, Porter and Kramer turn to the coffee sector
and its challenges of a reliable supply:
Most coffees are grown by small farmers in impoverished rural
areas of Africa and Latin America, who are trapped in a cycle of
low productivity, poor quality, and environmental degradation that
limits production volume. To address these issues, Nestlé
redesigned procurement. It worked intensively with its growers,
providing advice on farming practices, guaranteeing bank loans,
and helping secure inputs such as plant stock, pesticides, and
fertilizers. Nestlé established local facilities to measure the quality
of the coffee at the point of purchase, which allowed it to pay a
207
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premium for better beans directly to the growers and thus improve
their incentives. Greater yield per hectare and higher production
quality increased growers’ incomes, and the environmental impact
of farms shrank. Meanwhile, Nestlé’s reliable supply of good
coffee grew significantly. Shared value was created.
Embedded in the Nestlé example is a far broader insight, which is
the advantage of buying from capable local suppliers. Outsourcing
to other locations and countries creates transaction costs and
inefficiencies that can offset lower wage and input costs. Capable
local suppliers help firms avoid these costs and can reduce cycle
time, increase flexibility, foster faster learning, and enable
innovation. Buying local includes not only local companies but
also local units of national or international companies. When firms
buy locally, their suppliers can get stronger, increase their profits,
hire more people, and pay better wages—all of which will benefit
other businesses in the community. Shared value is created.209
Consequently, shared value, like bounded self-interest, can promote
capitalism. Rather than fearing regulatory dictates to prevent them from
exploiting suppliers (and lobbying governments on measures to promote
such exploitation),210 enlightened firms will see how profits can be attained,
not through exploitation (e.g., creating demand for harmful or useless
products), but through collaboration and trust, and in better helping
suppliers and consumers solve their problems. Sustainability, rather than a
cost, represents an opportunity for companies to improve productivity and
societal welfare.
CONCLUSION
Developing the legal standards for monopsonization claims will be
more complex than simply mirroring the monopolization standards. Courts
and agencies cannot rely on market share thresholds alone as monopsonists
can have relatively lower market shares. Nor can they rely on a consumer
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welfare screen premised on economic self-interest. Accordingly, as one
participant recognized about monopsony and buyer power, “the central
economic issues facing the food system have little to do with economic
efficiency, but a lot to do with fairness and economic freedom for farmers
and ranchers.”211 The U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder agreed:
the overriding concern we have in the Justice Department is
maintaining fairness. Doesn't mean we're going to put our thumb
on the scale. We want everybody to have a fair shot. . . . As [the
Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division] indicated,
you know, big is not necessarily bad, but big can be bad if the
power that comes from being big is misused, and that is simply not
something that this Department of Justice is going to stand for.
We will use every tool that we have to ensure fairness in the
marketplace.212
The challenge for the competition agencies is to develop these tools, in a
way that promotes consumers’ concerns of fairness and the rule of law.
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